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An Analysis of the 1960
Amendments to the Kentucky
Workmen's Compensation Law
°
By HERBERT L. SEGAL*
In a recent issue of the KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL there ap-
peared an historical analysis of the Kentucky Workmen's Com-
pensation Law and all of its amendments to that date.' That
article contained the following statement: "Most of the amend-
ments to the Act have been by agreement between the repre-
sentatives of the employer groups and labor groups. Without an
'agreed bill' the chances for passage of proposed amendments
have been extremely limited."2 The statement was true at the
time. However, the 1960 amendments, effective June 16, 1960,
were not the result of an "agreed bill".
Essentially this is a continuation of the previous article, and
the same general format, i.e., an analysis of each amendment and
its effect on the existing statute and case law, will be used.
KRS § 342.005-EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES TO WHOM CHAPTER
APPLIES; VOLUNTARY ELECTION TO COMM UNDER CHAPTER.
The changes in this section, i.e. new subsections (2) and (8),
provide that the Board shall apportion the aggregate extent and
duration of disability among, but not limited to, the following
contributive causes:
00 Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 342 (1960) (hereinafter cited as KRS).
* Mr. Segal is a former member of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation
Board and a member of the Labor Committee of the American Bar Association.
A member of the Louisville, Kentucky, and American Bar Associations, Mr. Segal
is a practicing attorney in Louisville, Kentucky, where he specializes in labor-
management relations and labor law.
1 Segal, "An Historical Analysis of the Kentucky Workmen's Law", 47 Ky.
L.J. 279 (1959).
2 Id. at 359.
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(a) 'Traumatic injury by accident.'
(b) Pre-existing disease previously disabling.
(c) Pre-existing disease not previously disabling but
aroused into disabling reality by the injury or occupa-
tional disease ...
The Board also must determine in each case whether the pro-
visions of KRS 342.120 are applicable. If these provisions are
applicable, the Board must then proceed in accordance with the
law and the regulations established by the Board for the process-
ing of claims involving the Subsequent Claim Fund, which was
established by the new amendments.
Apparently the Board is free to adopt certain regulations
relative to the processing of claims under the Subsequent Claim
Fund, within the limitations of KRS § 342.260 and consistent with
the provisions of Chapter 342. To date no such regulations have
been published.
It is submitted that the Legislature by adding the new
sections has to a great extent restored the law as it existed prior
to the 1948 amendment. That amendment added to the phrase
"nor shall it include the results of a disease" the words "whether
previously disabling or not".4
Under the 1960 Amendments, if a pre-existing disease was not
previously disabling but is aroused into disability by an injury or
occupational disease, the employer, in whose employment the
current injury occurs, while not fully liable, is subject to the terms
of KRS § 342.120 (the Subsequent Claim Fund-formerly the
Subsequent Injury Fund).
If, therefore, an injured employee has been previously dis-
abled, from a compensable injury or an occupational disease or a
pre-existing disease, or if a pre-existing, dormant, non-disabling
diseased condition is aroused and the claimant can meet the
requisites of the Subsequent Claim Fund section, disability may
3 Before discussing the significance of these changes, it is interesting to point
out that in KRS § 342.005 (2) (a) where injury by accident is described, the
word "personal" is omitted, even though in the body of KRS § 342.005 (1) the
words "traumatic personal injury by accident" are used. And although KRS §
342.005 (2) (b) speaks of pre-existing disease", there is no mention of a
"pre-existing condition" in this section.
4 Wood-Mosaic Co. v. Shumate, 305 Ky. 368, 204 S.W. 2d 831 (1947). See
also Belcher v. Cornman's Adm'x, 265 S.W. 2d 492 (Ky. 1954), and Highland
Co., Inc. v. Goben, 295 Ky. 803, 175 S.W. 2d 124 (1943).
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be paid both under KRS § 342.005 by his present employer and
under KRS § 342.120 by the Subsequent Claim Fund.
KRS § 342.010--"EMPLOYER" TO INCLUDE MUNICn
CORPORATIONS AND STATE
Although KRS § 342.010 has not been directly amended,
House Bill No. 472 has enlarged and expanded this section by
including the power of acceptance for the Department of Military
Affairs covering members of the Kentucky National Guard. KRS
§ 842.010 provides that "employer" as used in the Chapter also
includes any other department or agency of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky.
It is assumed that House Bill No. 472 was passed in order to
avoid any possible question being raised when the Department of
Military Affairs makes its election.
KRS § 342.020-MEDIcAL TREATMENT AT EXPENSE OF
EMPLOYER; ARTIFICIAL MEMBERS AND BRACES.
A new subsection of KRS § 342.020 provides for an additional
sum of $1,000 for medical, surgical and hospital treatments when
ordered by the Board upon application and sufficient showing
of justifiable need. The procedure for the additional payments
will probably be by motion of the claimant, supported by an
affidavit of a physician with notice to all interested parties. It is
assumed that counter-affidavits by the employer could also be
filed. Then, as in the case of a motion to reopen under KRS §
342.125, the matter would be referred to a Referee for a hearing.
A further amendment in this section changes the clause "for
loss of natural teeth" to "loss of teeth", which of course means,
medical benefits are now payable for loss of natural or artificial
teeth.
It is submitted that even though the following may have been
a mere oversight, nevertheless, some conflict exists in this amend-
ment because of the following phrase; ". . . but the employer's
liability for such artificial member or braces shall not including his
liability for medical, surgical and hospital treatment exceed
$2,500". This seems in conflict with subsection (2) which may
allow for the additional $1,000 upon application and sufficient
showing.
1960]
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This section will probably be construed to mean that "where
there is an additional order by the Board, the amount may be
increased by $1,000."
KRS § 342.070-CoNPENSATION IN CASE OF DEATH
The only change in this section is the amount of compensation
payable. The amendment increases the maximum benefits from
$12,000 to $13,600 and increases payments for burial expenses
commensurate with the standard of living of the deceased, from
a maximum of $300 to a maximum of $500.
Even with the increased benefits the amount received by the
dependents of a deceased employee is still $2,000 less than the
maximum benefits payable for total disability to an injured
employee.
KRS § 342.095-CoMraxSATION FOR TOTAL Disnmsrry
The amendment to KRS § 342.095 increases the allowable
compensation for total disability. The maximum benefits are
now $30 per week as increased from $32 per week or a maximum
of $15,600 increased from $13,600. In addition a new subsection
was added which provides that compensation for an injury or
disability to a member shall not exceed the amount allowable
for the loss of such member, unless the effects of the injury or
disability extend beyond the member to the body as a whole,
so that it destroys a workman's general ability to labor or pre-
cludes him from obtaining the kind of work he is customarily
able to do. This new clause is exactly the same as the language
found in an amendment to KRS § 342.110. It is submitted that
this new language in KRS § 342.095 does little more than codify
the existing case law.5
KRS § 342.110-OTIER PERmANENT PARTLAL DisABiLrry;
COMPENSATION
In addition to the increase of maximum benefits payable
under this section to $31 per week or a total of $12,400, significant
5 See Clark v. Gilley, 311 S.W. 2d 391 (Ky. 1958). Prior to the 1960
amendments to KRS § 342.110 that section contained a clause providing that in
no event should compensation for injury or disability to a member exceed the
amount allowable for the loss of such member. However, where total disability
for work within the meaning of the Act eisted, even though the injury was only
to a member, the Court of Appeals had upheld awards for total disability since
the limitation of KRS § 342.110 was not included in KRS § 342.095.
Vol. 49,
ANALYSIS OF THE 1960 AmENDmmrs
changes were made with respect to injuries to members of the
body.8
Prior to the 1960 amendments, this section provided that in
no event could compensation for injury or disability to a member
exceed the amount allowable for the loss of such member. This
language has been deleted from the section and replaced by the
exact language found in KRS § 342.095. It is provided that
compensation for an injury or disability to a member shall not
exceed the amount allowable for the loss of such member, unless
the effects of the injury or disability extend beyond the member
to the body as a whole and adversely affect a woman's general
ability to labor, or limits his occupational opportunities to obtain
the kind of work he is customarily able to do.
This change overrules all of the Court of Appeals decisions
construing this part of KRS § 342.110 after the 1946 amendment,
holding that the amount of compensation for an injury to the
member could not exceed the amount payable for the loss of the
member.7
In the Caney Creek Mining Company8 case there is a discus-
sion of the law as it existed prior to the 1946 amendment. It was
held in that case that to be entitled to additional compensation
for an injury to a member, other than for complete severance of
the member, the employee must show that the injury is of such
a nature as to more adversely affect his body, his mind, his
sense of pain, his ability to labor, or his opportunity to obtain
employment than would be the case had there been a complete
severance.
9
KRS § 342.111-Co lulcANcE OF DisABnrr PAYMENTS TO
DEPENDENTS WHEN EMPLOYEE DiES BEFORE ALL OF
DisAiLrrY Awxm HAs BEN PAD.
The dependent of the deceased employee now has one year
after the date of death to fie his claim for continuance of pay-
0 Maximum benefits for temporary partial disability have been increased to
$31 per week, not to exceed a maximum sum of $12,400. KRS 342.100. Maximum
benefits for enumerated permanent partial disabilities have been increased to $30
per week. KRS § 342.105.
7 Caney Creek Mining Co. v. Rager, 264 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1954). See also
Segal, "An Historical Analysis of the Kentucky Workmens Compensation Law",
supra note 1 at 311.
8 264 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1954).
9 See also Black Mountain Corp. v. Letner, 303 Ky. 807, 199 S.W. 2d 611
(1947); American Bridge Co. v. Reit, 303 Ky. 795, 199 S.W. 2d 447 (1947);
Patton v. Travis, 298 Ky. 678, 183 S.W. 2d 956 (1944).
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ments with the Workmen's Compensation Board. The period
has thus been doubled.
This section was also amended to bring it in conformity with
benefits payable for death as set forth in KRS § 342.070. The
maximum weekly amounts now are not to exceed $34 per week.
Prior to this amendment the weekly payments could not exceed
$15 per week.
KRS § 342.120-SuBsEQtmN INJURY, COMPENSATION IN
CASE OF; PAYMENTS FROM SUBSEQUENT CLAIM FUND
The Subsequent Injury section has been so extensively revised
that it is necessary to set its provisions out in full. KRS § 341.120
provides:
(1) A claimant may in the original application for benefits,
or either party may by motion while the case is pend-
ing, accompanied by proper allegations, and the board
shall upon its own motion at any time before the
rendition of the final award, cause the Subsequent
Claim Fund to be made a party to the proceedings if
either or both of the following appears:
(a) The employee is disabled, whether from a com-
pensable injury, occupational disease, pre-existing
disease, or otherwise, and has received a subse-
quent compensable injury by accident, or has de-
veloped an occupational disease.
(b) The employee is found to have a dormant non-
disabling disease condition which was aroused or
brought into disabling reality by reason of a
subsequent compensable injury by accident or an
occupational disease.
(2) When the Subsequent Claim Fund has been made a
party the Board shall direct the procedures provided in
KRS 842.121.
(8) If it is found that the employee is a person mentioned
in subsection (1) (a) or (b) and a subsequent com-
pensable injury or occupational disease has resulted in
additional permanent disability so that the degree of
disability caused by the combined disabilities is greater
than that which would have resulted from the sub-
sequent injury or occupational disease alone, and the
employee is entitled to receive compensation on the
basis of the combined disabilities, the employer shall
be liable only for the degree of disability which would
[Vol. 49,
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have resulted from the latter injury or occupational
disease had there been no pre-existing disability or
dormant, but aroused diseased condition.
(4) The remaining compensation for which such resulting
condition would entitle the employe, including any
compensation for disability resulting from a dormant
disease aroused into disabling reality by the injury or
occupational disease, but excluding all compensation
which the provisions of this chapter would have af-
forded on account of prior disabling disease bad it been
compensated thereunder, shall be paid out of the
Subsequent Claim Fund provided for in subsection (1)
of KRS 842.122.
(5) Upon motion, with notice to the Commissioner of
Industrial Relations, and it appearing to the Board that
a claimant who has been awarded compensation under
any one of the several provisions of this chapter be-
comes re-employed by the employer against whom the
award was made, or continues in his employment in
which he was injured, any part of the award not paid
at the time the claimant becomes re-employed shall be
paid out of the Subsequent Claim Fund; or, if the
claimant has continued in his employment then the
whole award shall be paid from the Subsequent Claim
Fund. Said unpaid portion of the award shall be
awarded against the Subsequent Claim Fund and paid
by the Commissioner of Industrial Relations as are all
other Subsequent Claim awards. The employment or
re-employment contemplated herein shall be at wages
equal to or greater than the employee was receiving
before the traumatic injury by accident.
As pointed out previously, the Board in every case, must de-
termine whether the above provisions are applicable, by virtue
of the mandate of KRS § 42.005 (3).
The actual proof necessary for a recovery under the sub-
sequent injury provisions, i.e., that the combined disability be
greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent
injury or occupational disease alone, has not been changed. The
significant change is that if an employee is previously disabled
from a compensable injury, pre-existing disease, either dormant,
non-disabling, or otherwise, 10 then the Subsequent Claim Fund
10 See Shuman Co. v. May, 327 S.W. 2d 14 (Ky. 1959) and Combs v. Gaggey,
282 S.W. 2d 817 (Ky. 1955) for discussions of this section prior to the deletion of
the old KRS 342.120 (2).
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shall be used, with the employer still being liable for only the
degree of disability which would have resulted from the latest
injury or occupational disease had there been no pre-existing dis-
ability or dormant but aroused diseased condition, with the
Subsequent Claim Fund, assuming the necessary proof is pre-
sented, being responsible for the payment of the other benefits.
It is interesting to note the use of the words "dormant non-
disabling disease condition" as contrasted with KRS § 42.005
(2) (c) which speaks in terms of pre-existing disease only,
without the use of "condition"."
The Subsequent Injury Fund (now the Subsequent Claim
Fund), even though established by the original Act of 1916 and
amended in 1946 and 1948, has not been extensively utilized by
litigants. It is submitted, however, that with the changes made
by the 1960 Legislature there will be more and more use of the
Subsequent Claim Fund by employers, claimants and the Board.
KRS § 342.120 (5) is a most interesting and significant section,
and should definitely encourage the employment of injured
employees and particularly the handicapped. It specifically
provides that upon motion and notice, where a claimant who
has been awarded compensation under any one of the several
provisions of this Chapter becomes re-employed by the employer
against whom the award was made, or the claimant has continued
in his employment after he was injured, any part of the award
not paid at the time the claimant becomes re-employed shall
be paid out of the Subsequent Claim Fund. Further, if the
claimant has continued in his employer's employment, then the
whole award shall be paid under the Subsequent Claim Fund.
Any unpaid portion of the award shall be against the Subsequent
Claim Fund and shall be paid by the Commissioner of Industrial
Relations, as are all other subsequent claim awards. Note that
this is compensation under any one of the several provisions of
this Chapter, and not just KRS § 342.120.
Note further the limitation of subsection (5): "The employ-
ment or re-employment contemplated herein shall be at wages
equal to or greater than the employee was receiving before the
traumatic injury by accident." It is assumed that there was an
11 See Parrot v. Healy, 290 S.W. 2d 798 (Ky. 1956) and its use of the
word "condition".
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oversight, or that it can be implied that this limitation would
also include "before the occupational disease" as well.
KRS § 342.121-REFEENCE OF MEDICAL QUESTION IN SUBSEQUENT
INJURY CASES TO PHYSICIAN; CONCLUSIVENESS OF FINDINGS; REVIEw.
The principal change in this section provides for a reference
by the Board in subsequent injury cases, to one physician rather
than to a medical panel. Further, this physician shall be paid a
reasonable fee plus necessary expenses without the limitation of
$20.00 for examination and report as previously provided. The
amendment further provides a specific date-not more than
fifteen days after the examination-within which time the examin-
ing physician must submit his report to the Board.
In order to correct what may have been an oversight, the new
amendment specifically includes claims for disability resulting
from a subsequent injury by occupational disease as well as
accidents.
KRS § 842.122-SUBSEQUENT CLAIM FUND; TAX FOR; CnDrrs AND
WITHDRAVALs; CONTINUANCE FROM YEAR TO YEAR;
MAximum Lnvrr.
The commissioner of Industrial Relations, if he finds that the
tax previously levied is insufficient to pay the claims awarded
under the Subsequent Claim Fund, may levy an additional assess-
ment against all insurance companies and every employer carrying
his own insurance in an amount not to exceed $100,000. The
amount of each insurance company's assessment shall be in the
proportion that each company's annual workmen's compensation
premiums written in Kentucky bear to the total of all the annual
workmen's compensation premiums written in Kentucky, as set
forth in the last filed annual statement with the Department of
Insurance.
The assessment against the employer carrying his own risk
insurance will be based upon the premium which would have
been paid had the coverage been carried by an insurance carrier,
as determined by the payroll information filed with the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations.
The Subsequent Injury Fund is abolished and its monies and
property are transferred to the newly created Subsequent Claim
Fund.
1960]
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KRS § 842.125-avmw BY BOARD OF PREviOUS AwAiD OR ORDER
A new subsection has been added which provides that where
an agreement has become an Award by approval of the Board
and a review of such Award is initiated, no statement contained
in the agreement, whether as to jurisdiction, liability of the
employer, nature and extent of the disability or as to any other
matter, shall be considered by the Board as an admission against
the interests of any party. The parties may raise any issue upon
review of this type of award which could have been considered
upon an original application for benefits. This amendment seems
generally in line with Court of Appeals decisions on this point.'3
This new subsection must be read in conjunction with the
amendments to KRS § 842.265 which preclude the running of
the Statute of Limitations where an agreement has been reached,
until that agreement has been filed with the Board.
KRS § 342.185-NoTicE OF AccmENT; CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION;
TnmE oF FlmNG
The 1960 amendment, which deletes the previous language
to the effect that in cases of silicosis no application for compensa-
tion could be considered unless the notice was given and the
claim was made within three years after the last injurious
exposure to slicicosis, brings the limitation period for silicosis
claims in conformity with all other occupational diseases and
eliminates any conflict between KRS § 842.185 and KRS § 842.316
that may have formerly existed.
KRS § 842.265-COMPENSATON AGREEMENTS; SUBJECT TO
APPROVAL OF BoARD.
This section now provides that if the injured employee and
his employer reach an agreement for payment of compensation
12 The last sentence of subsection 3 seems to contain an ambiguity or a
gramatical error, when it states: "The physician shall also include in his report
a statement indicating the physician or physicians, if any, who appeared before
thm .... " (emphasis added). Obviously the word "him" should be used since
there is only one physician to be appointed under this section. The same comment
would hold true in the following: ". . . and what, if any, medical reports and
x-rays were considered by them." (emphasis added), unless "them" refers to the
physicians appearing before the physician appointed by the Board. However
comparing this language with the language prior to this amendment it would
seem that the reference here is to medical reports and x-rays considered by
the Board's appointed physician.
-1 See Clear Fork Coal Co. v. Gaylord, 286 S.W. 2d 519 (Ky. 1956).
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conforming to the provisions of the act, a memorandum of the
agreement must be filed with the board. If the agreement is filed
and approved by the Board, it is enforceable as other awards of
the Board. Voluntary payment of compensation as prescribed in
the act, without formal agreement, are still permitted; however,
nothing operates as a final settlement of a claim, except a
memorandum of agreement filed with and approved by the board.
Further, time limitations begin to run only upon the date the
agreement is filed with and approved by the board. The amend-
ment, in effect, nullifies by statute the decisions holding that the
filing of the agreements was not mandatory. 14
The section now is the same as before, except that the phrase
"or the expiration of the time limit prescribed in KRS § 342.185"
has been deleted. The following significant language has been
added: "No limitations of time shall begin to run until the date
upon which such agreement is filed with and approved by the
Board."
Since the time limitations do not begin to run until the filing
and approval, if the employee can show the requisites of reopen-
ing under KRS § 342.125, he still may be entitled to additional
compensation benefits. What may happen is that the carriers
of the employers will insist, when a claim is settled, that the
claimant dismiss his application with prejudice, thereby preclud-
ing a reopening since there will be nothing to reopen. Employees
should be wary of this procedure.
The statutory provisions setting out the procedure for appeals
of Board decisions to the circuit courts 5 has been changed in
that the requirement that the petition be verified by the petitioner
has been eliminated. The further requirement that copies of the
petition be furnished to the respondent at the time of the filing
of the petition, has likewise been eliminated. The procedure
now brings appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Board in
conformity with the procedure for filing petitions in circuit courts
as set out in Rule 11, Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
4 Adkins v. International Harvester Co., 286 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1956);
Fiorela v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W. 2d 208 (1944).
15 KRS 342.285.
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KRS § 342.316-OccuPATioNAL DISEASE; DEFINED; CLAIM AND
ALLOWANCE OF COMPENSATION FOR.
Prior to the 1960 amendments, KRS § 342.316 (3) provided
that where compensation had been paid or awarded, either for
disability or death from an occupational disease, and payments
had been discontinued, the claim for further compensation must
be made within one year after the last payment of compensation.
This provision had been interpreted as superseding KRS § 342.125
in silicosis cases.16
With the deletion of this section, the reopening of all awards
for compensable injuries are controlled by KRS § 342.125. KRS
§ 342.316 (4) has been clarified so that now, in claims for
compensation due to the occupational disease of silicosis, it must
be shown that the employee was exposed to the hazards of the
disease in his employment within this Commonwealth "for at
least two years immediately next before his disability or death."
A further change in KRS § 842.316-the significance of which
is not apparent to the writer other than perhaps as an improve-
ment gramatically-is the use of the word "of" instead of "to"
in the phrase "as a natural incident to the work".
17
An increase in the net surplus of credit of the Maintenance
Fund' from $200,000 to $300,000 was provided for by the 1960
Legislature.
The penalties section of the Act 19 has been amended by
adding a new subsection (7) which provides that any person
who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of KRS § 342.265,
which is the statutory limitation on the filing of settlement agree-
ments, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500.
Conclusions
The 1960 amendments not only increased the awardable
benefits but also dramatically and significantly revamped the
employer's position as to the payments of compensation benefits.
The primary concerns of the injured employee and the phi-
losophy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act as well,
16 Harvey Coal Co. v. Colwell, 313 S.W. 2d 274 (Ky. 1958).
17KRS § 342.316 (1) (a).
18 KRS § 342.485.
19 KRS § 42.990.
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is whether he will receive benefits when he is unable to work
and his ability to become gainfully employed again; and the effect
his injury has on that ability to compete in the general labor
market. The opportunity of the employer to reduce or eliminate
that concern through the lessened financial responsibility pro-
vided by KRS § 842.120 (5) when employment is offered to
injured employees, presents a solution to a most serious problem
to the employee, the employer and to society in general. As con-
cluded in the previous article, the one remaining general area
wherein there still exists a void in the Kentucky Act is in the field
of rehabilitation.
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